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Appellee James Friedman ("Friedman") hereby submits his Brief 
of the Appellee. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
This appeal presents the following issues: 
1. Did the district court correctly rule that, as a matter 
of law, a note executed by Friedman in 1987 was void for lack of 
consideration? That ruling is reviewed for correctness, without 
deferring to the district court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1990). 
2. Did the district court correctly rule that, as a matter 
of law, the 1987 Note did not revive a loan Appellant Danny Kramer 
("Kramer") allegedly made to Friedman in 1981? That ruling is 
reviewed for correctness, without deferring to the district court's 
legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 
1990). 
3. Did the district court correctly rule that, as a matter 
of law, Kramer was not harmed by Friedman's alleged fraud? That 
ruling is reviewed for correctness, without deferring to the 
district court's legal conclusions. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 
497, 499 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Course of Proceedings 
Kramer originally brought suit on a promissory note Friedman 
executed in 1987 for the sum of $15,000 (the "1987 Note") . See 
Complaint, R. 2-3. Kramer later filed an Amended Complaint, in 
which he also claimed that the 1987 Note constituted a written 
acknowledgement of a loan of $5,000 Kramer had allegedly made to 
Friedman in 1981 (the "1981 Loan"), thereby reviving that loan, and 
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that Friedman had defrauded Kramer in executing the 1987 Note. See 
Amended Complaint, R. 50-58. 
Friedman moved for summary judgment, contending that, as a 
matter of law, the 1987 Note was void for lack of consideration, 
the 1987 Note did not revive the 1981 Loan and Kramer had failed 
to show he was harmed by Friedman's alleged fraud. See Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R. 39-40. The district court granted Friedman's 
Motion, ruling as follows: 
I am of the view that as inequitable, Mr. Rognlie, 
as it may be, that the limitations period in this case 
did commence on the date that the Amended Complaint 
states it did and based upon the testimony in the 
deposition of Mr. Kramer. 
I am, moreover, convinced that there has been no 
acknowledgement to comply with the law of this state and 
that the consideration, alleged consideration, must fail 
because there was no obligation owing at the time of the 
note in March of '87. 
See Reporter's Transcript of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Proceedings, p. 21, 11. 1-10 (attached hereto as Addendum "A"). 
II. Statement of Facts 
The following facts were deemed admitted solely for the 
purpose of Friedman's Motion for Summary Judgment. No genuine 
issues of material fact exist. 
1. On or about March 12, 1981, Kramer loaned Friedman the 
sum of $5,000 (the "1981 Loan"). See Amended Complaint, para. 9, 
R. 29. 
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2. Friedman agreed to repay the 1981 Loan within sixty to 
ninety days of March 12, 1981. See Amended Complaint, para. 13, 
R. 52; Deposition of Daniel Albert Kramer ("Kramer Deposition"), 
R. 89, 93, and Correction Sheet, R. 155. 
3. On or about March 21, 1987, Friedman executed a 
promissory note in Kramer's favor for the sum of $15,000 (the "1987 
Note").1 See Amended Complaint, para. 3, R. 50; Promissory Note, 
attached hereto as Addendum "B". 
4. On June 10, 1988, Kramer commenced this action to collect 
on the 1987 Note. See Complaint, R. 2-3. Kramer later amended his 
complaint to state two additional causes of action on the 1987 Note 
one for a determination that the Note was a written 
acknowledgment of the 1981 Loan and one that Friedman defrauded 
Kramer by giving Kramer the 1987 Note. See Amended Complaint, R. 
50-58. Kramer has never sued on the 1981 Loan. 
5. Kramer explained the delay in commencing an action on the 
grounds that he had granted Friedman extensions of time to repay 
xKramer relies on the Friedman Deposition, R. 116-117, 120, 
128, for the proposition that Friedman acknowledged the existence 
of the 1981 Loan when he executed the 1987 Note and agreed to sign 
that note as a compromised payoff of the 1981 Loan. The pages in 
the record cited by Kramer do not support that proposition. 
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the 1981 Loan when Friedman confessed he could not repay the 1981 
Loan.2 See, Kramer Affidavit, para. 8, R. 81. 
6. Sometime in December, 1987 or August, 1988, after the 
1987 Note was signed, Friedman made a payment of $1,110.65 on 
Kramer's behalf to First Interstate Bank. See Kramer Affidavit, 
para. 10, R. 82; Deposition of James E. Friedman ("Friedman 
Deposition"), R. 107. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) determines whether the 1981 Loan 
was an enforceable obligation when the 1987 Note was executed. 
That statute provides as follows: 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also 
on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and 
for any article charged on a store account; also on an 
open account for work, labor or services rendered, or 
materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the 
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four 
years after the last charge is made or the last payment 
is received. 
2In his brief, Kramer relies upon the Friedman Deposition, R. 
114-15, 121, as support for the proposition that Friedman requested 
and obtained extensions of time in which to repay the 1981 loan. 
The pages in the record cited by Kramer do not support that 
proposition. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 determines whether the 1987 Note 
constitutes a written acknowledgement of the 1981 Loan. That 
statute provides as follows: 
In any case founded upon a contract, when any part 
of the principal or interest shall have been paid or an 
acknowledgement of an existing liability, debt or claim 
or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an 
action may be brought within the period prescribed for 
the same after such payment, acknowledgement or promise; 
but such acknowledgement or promise must be in writing 
signed by the parties being charged thereby. When a 
right of action is barred by the provisions of any 
statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of 
action or a ground of defense. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. All of the consideration Kramer has alleged he exchanged 
for the 1987 Note is based on the 1981 Loan. Thus, the validity 
of that consideration depends on whether the 1981 Loan was an 
enforceable obligation when the 1987 Note was executed. Kramer's 
cause of action on the 1981 Loan arose within 60 to 90 days of 
March 12, 1981, when that loan became due and payable. 
Kramer's extensions of time for repayment did not modify the 
parties' agreement in that regard because those extensions were not 
supported by consideration. Consequently, pursuant to the four-
year statute of limitation provided in Utah Code .Ann. § 78-12-
25(1), the 1981 Loan was no longer an enforceable obligation when 
the 1987 Note was executed. 
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Friedman is not estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations because that argument was not raised below and the 
undisputed evidence below did not establish grounds for estoppel. 
The 1987 Note also did not constitute an accord and satisfaction. 
Before the district court, Kramer neither argued nor adequately 
supported his contention that the 1987 Loan constituted a 
settlement of doubtful and disputed claims. The district court 
correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, the 1987 Note was void 
for lack of consideration. 
2. Since the 1987 Note does not in any way refer to the 1981 
Loan or contain an unequivocal acknowledgment or promise to pay any 
existing debt, that note does not constitute a written 
acknowledgement of the 1981 loan. Moreover, since Kramer has 
neither sued on the 1981 Loan directly nor plead that a partial 
payment revived that obligation, the district court properly 
granted Friedman summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action set 
forth in the Amended Complaint. 
3. Kramer alleges that Friedman defrauded him in connection 
with the execution of the 1987 Note. All of the harm that Kramer 
alleges he suffered, however, is based on the 1981 Loan. Since, 
with or without the alleged fraud, Kramer could not have enforced 
the 1981 Loan, when the 1987 Note was executed, Kramer has not 
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alleged any harm flowing from the alleged fraud. Accordingly, 
summary judgment was properly granted on Kramer's fraud claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review 
This appeal involves the purely legal issue of whether the 
district court correctly ruled that Friedman is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law based on the material, undisputed facts 
presented by Kramer. See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 
1989); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Utah App. 1990); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court must review the low€*r court's 
legal conclusions for correctness and need not defer to those 
conclusions. Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App. 
1990); CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, 772 P.2d 967, 969 (Utah 
1989). In reviewing the summary judgment, the Court must also 
consider the facts in the light most favorable to Kramer. 
Whatcott. 790 P.2d at 580. None of those facts were disputed by 
Friedman for purposes of his motion. Under those standards, the 
district court properly granted Friedman summary judgment and its 
decision should be affirmed. 
II. The Court Should Disregard Arguments Raised for the First Time 
on Appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows: 
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For a question to be considered on appeal, the record 
must clearly show that it was timely presented to the 
trial court in a manner sufficient to obtain a ruling 
thereon; we cannot merely assume that it was properly 
raised. The burden is on the parties to make certain 
that the record they compile will adequately preserve 
their arguments for review in the event of an appeal. 
IFG Leasing v. Gordon, 776 P.2d 607, 616 (Utah 1989) (quoting 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 
1045 (Utah 1983)). 
Consequently, Utah appellate courts have persistently refused 
to consider arguments that were not raised in the trial court. 
See, e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l American Title Insurance 
Co. , 749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 1988) (refusing to consider estoppel 
argument where estoppel not argued to trial court); Turtle 
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc. , 645 P.2d 667, 672 
(Utah 1982) (refusing to consider defense that was plead but not 
argued below); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 
42, 46 (Utah App. 1988) (refusing to address challenges to 
affidavit that were not raised below). 
In this case, Kramer is arguing for the first time on appeal 
that (1) the statute of limitations did not begin to run while 
Kramer was making interest payments that were "reimbursable" by 
Friedman, (2) Friedman is estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations and (3) the 1987 Note constituted a settlement of 
doubtful and disputed claims. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15, 
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17-18. Kramer failed to give the district court an opportunity to 
consider and rule on those arguments and they should not be 
addressed by this Court. See Zions First Nat'l Bank, 749 P.2d at 
657. In addition, for the reasons set forth below, those arguments 
are without merit. See infra. pp. 16 n. 5 and 19-25. 
III. The district court correctly ruled that, as a matter of law, 
the 1987 Note was void for lack of consideration. 
All of the consideration Kramer alleged he exchanged for the 
1987 Note was based on the 1981 Loan. See Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 69. If the 1981 
Loan was unenforceable when the 1987 Note was given, no 
consideration was given for the 1987 Note. In addition, Kramer is 
now contending, for the first time, that (i) he agreed to settle 
a doubtful and disputed claim through the 1987 Note and that his 
"compromise" adequately supports the note, and (ii) Friedman should 
be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense. See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15 and 17-18. 
Before the district court, Kramer failed to show that the 1981 
Loan was enforceable when the 1987 Note was executed, and failed 
to present any evidence either that the 1987 Note involved the 
settlement of a disputed claim or in support of his contention that 
Friedman should be estopped from asserting the statute of 
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limitations. Accordingly the district court correctly ruled that 
the 1987 Note was void for lack of consideration. 
A. The district court properly ruled that, as a matter of 
law, the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90 
days of March 12, 1981. 
On appeal, Kramer does not dispute that the 1981 Loan was an 
obligation not founded on a written instrument. Kramer's cause of 
action on that loan arose, and thus the statute of limitations 
began to run, on the date that loan was due and payable. 
Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983) 
(statute of limitations begins to run the moment a cause of action 
arises); O'Hair v. Kounalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 463 P.2d 799, 800 
(1970) (cause of action on a debt begins to run when the debt is 
due and payable). Accordingly, Kramer was required to bring an 
action on that loan within four years of the date the 1981 Loan 
became due and payable. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1). 
In his Amended Complaint and throughout his deposition, Kramer 
alleged that the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90 days 
of March 12, 1981. See Amended Complaint, para. 13, R. 52; Kramer 
Deposition, R. 89, 93, and Correction Sheet, R. 155. Kramer, 
however, also alleges that he granted Friedman extensions of time 
in which to repay the loan and contends that those extensions 
prevented the statute of limitations from expiring on the 1981 
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Loan. See Kramer Affidavit, para. 8, R. 81; Appellant's Brief, pp. 
12-13. 
Kramer is essentially arguing that although the parties agreed 
that the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90 days of 
March 12, 1981, they later modified that agreement to extend the 
due date into the indefinite future. Kramer correctly states that 
the parties could orally modify their agreement. See Ted R. Brown 
& Associates v. Carnes, 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988). 
However, Kramer overlooks the fact that, under Utah law, such a 
modification is invalid unless supported by consideration. Wilson 
v. Gardner, 10 Utah 2d 89, 348 P.2d 931, 933 (Utah 1960); Bamberger 
Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc.. 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489, 
(1935); see also Holcombe v. Solinger & Sons Co., 238 F.2d 495, 499 
(5th Cir. 1956) (debtor must give valid consideration in exchange 
for agreement to extend time for repayment); Superior Concrete 
Pumping, Inc. v. David Montoya Const., Inc., 108 N.M. 401, 773 P.2d 
346, 349 (1989) (modification of oral contract must be supported 
by consideration); Jole v. Bredbenner, 95 Or. App. 193, 768 P.2d 
433, 435 (1989); Honolulu Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Murphy, 753 
P.2d 807, 813 (Hawaii App. 1988). 
For example, in Jole, tenants had fallen far behind on rent 
payments pursuant to a month-to-month lease. The landlord and his 
tenants had allegedly modified the arrangement by agreeing that, 
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in exchange for, inter alia, a promise to timely remit rent 
payments, the landlord would forebear on collecting the amounts 
past due. The landlord later sued to collect the amounts owing 
under the lease. The trial court ruled that the landlord was bound 
by the modification and dismissed the action. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
modification was void for lack of consideration. Jole, 768 P.2d 
at 435. The court stated that since the tenants were already 
legally bound to make timely payments, their promises to do so did 
not support the landlord's forbearance. Id. Thus, the agreement 
had not been modified and the landlord could collect the full 
amount due. 
In contrast, in Murphy, the Hawaii Court of Appeals reversed 
a summary judgment in favor of a creditor who sued on an 
unconditional guaranty. The guarantor alleged that the creditor 
agreed to pursue its real property collateral before suing on the 
guaranty, and thus that the guaranty had been modified. Before the 
lower court, the guarantor had submitted an affidavit which alleged 
that, in exchange for the modification, the guarantor had agreed 
to provide information to assist the foreclosure. 
The court held that the provision of such information could 
constitute consideration. Murphy, 753 P.2d at 814. Consequently, 
the court reversed the summary judgment, holding that the affidavit 
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created a genuine issue as to whether the guaranty had been 
modified. Id.; Cf. Holcombe, 238 F.2d at 499 (debtor's transfer 
of negotiable trade acceptances to creditor adequately supported 
extension of time for repayment); Superior Concrete, 773 P.2d at 
346 (modification valid where, in exchange for hourly surcharge, 
contractor accepted concrete pours greatly below the guaranteed 
minimum). 
In this case, Kramer presented no evidence below, by affidavit 
or otherwise, regarding the consideration Friedman exchanged for 
the extensions. Kramer simply alleged that "Friedman also 
repeatedly requested additional time to repay the loan, and I 
agreed to extend the time for repayment of the loan when he so 
requested." See Kramer Affidavit, para. 8, R. 81. At best, the 
record contains evidence that Friedman promised to repay the 1981 
Loan, which he was already obligated to do, in exchange for the 
extensions. A promise to perform a preexisting legal duty, 
however, does not constitute valid consideration. Tates, Inc. v. 
Little America Refining, Co., 535 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah 1975) 
(observing that, where a debtor makes a part payment on a debt, the 
creditor is ordinarily not bound by any promise to accept that 
payment in satisfaction of debt because the debtor has only 
performed a preexisting legal duty and has given no consideration 
for the promise); see also Jole, 768 P.2d at 435. 
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Thus, unlike the guarantor in Murphy, Kramer failed to 
demonstrate that the parties entered into an enforceable 
modification extending the time for repayment of the 1981 Loan. 
Instead, the record shows that any extensions of time were not 
supported by consideration and thus, as the district court ruled, 
the 1981 Loan was due and payable within 60 to 90 days of March 12, 
1981. The statute of limitations began running on that date, 
leaving Kramer four years in which to enforce the 1981 Loan.3 
3The cases cited by Kramer do not dictate a contrary result. 
Estate of Giguere, 366 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Minn. App. 1985) did hold 
that the parties in that case entered into a valid and binding 
agreement extending the time for repayment of a note and thus that 
the statute of limitations did not begin running until the new due 
date. However, that agreement was not challenged for lack of 
consideration and the court did not discuss the issue. Further, 
the debtor apparently agreed to sell certain property to satisfy 
the note; that agreement could have served as consideration for the 
extension. 
Further, while Colorado Inv. Services, Inc. v. Hager, 685 P.2d 
1371, 1377 (Colo. App. 1984) held that a modification of the time 
for performance of a condition does not need consideration, Utah 
law requires modifications to be supported by consideration. See 
Wilson v. Gardner, 348 P.2d 931, 933 (1960); Bamberger Co. v. 
Certified Productions, Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489, (Utah 1935). 
In addition, Intermedics, Inc. v. Grady, 683 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex. 
App. 1984) and King v. Edel, 69 Ga. App. 607, 26 S.E.2d 365, 370 
(1943) are irrelevant. Grady held that the plaintiff commenced 
suit within the limitations period and King held that a renewal 
note, executed within the limitations period, extended the time in 
which the creditor could sue on the original note. Finally, Ted 
R. Brown & Associates v. Carnes, 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988) 
held only that a written contract may be orally modified. 
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Kramer's failure to do so rendered Friedman's obligation on the 
1981 Loan illusory and not valid consideration for the 1987 Note. 
B. The 1981 Loan was no longer legally enforceable when the 
1987 Note was executed; consequently, Kramer gave no 
consideration for the note. 
Kramer argued below that the 1981 Loan, interest payments on 
that loanf Kramer's acceptance of a compromise payoff amount on 
that loan and Kramer's forbearance on that loan served as 
consideration for the 1987 Note. It is undisputed that the 1987 
Note was executed on or about March 21, 1987. See Amended 
Complaint, para. 3, R. 50. Thus, by the time that note was 
executed, the 1981 Loan, the interest payments related thereto and 
the alleged promises could not constitute valid consideration 
because the 1981 Loan was no longer legally enforceable. Manwill 
v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (1961).4 
4Friedman's partial payment on the 1981 Loan, which was made 
in either December, 1987 or August, 1988 does not affect this 
result. See Kramer Affidavit, para. 10, R. 82. Even if that 
payment revived the 1981 Loan, it is undisputed that it was made 
after the 1987 Note was executed. See Appellant's Brief, p. 8, 
para. 16. Thus, when the 1987 Note was executed, the 1981 Loan 
remained a barred obligation. 
Furthermore, Kramer abandons plain statutory language in 
arguing that the statute of limitations did not begin running until 
the last interest "charge" was paid by Kramer that was 
"reimbursable" by Friedman. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1). 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-12-25(1) simply cannot be read in that 
manner. First, the statute does not state that the limitations 
period is tolled while a creditor makes interest payments that are 
"reimbursable" by the debtor. 
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In Manwill, plaintiff made payments on defendants' behalf in 
1950, 1951, 1952 and 1953, and in 1954 plaintiff transferred a 
grazing permit and 18 head of cattle to defendants. Plaintiff 
conceded that the statute of limitations barred an action to 
recover those payments and transfers but alleged that defendants 
had orally agreed to pay him back within the limitations period. 
Plaintiff contended that the oral agreement was supported by the 
defendants' moral, if not legally enforceable, obligation to repay 
him. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that 
the moral obligation to repay plaintiff did not constitute valid 
consideration. The Court held that "it seems obvious that if a 
contract to be legally enforceable need be anything more than a 
naked promise, something more than mere moral consideration is 
necessary."5 Id. Thus, the 1981 Loan was not valid consideration 
for the 1987 note. 
Secondly, the "charge" referred to in the statute means an 
additional debt on an open account, not the accrual of interest on 
a loan. If interest accrual were a "charge," the statute would be 
rendered meaningless since interest is always accruing and the 
statute would never begin running. 
5Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1036, 1038 (1896) is not to 
the contrary. That case holds merely that an antecedent debt is 
sufficient consideration to support a written acknowledgement of 
the debt. 
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Furthermore, Kramer's alleged promises were not valid 
consideration for the 1987 Note because they were neither 
detrimental to Kramer no beneficial to Friedman. Sugarhouse 
Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Allen v. 
Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d 823, 825 (1951); see 
also Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 
Inc. , 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Since the 1981 Loan was not 
legally enforceable, Kramer could not have recovered any amount 
based on the 1981 Loan and any further collection efforts by him 
would have been futile when the parties executed the Note. 
Finally, the interest payments Kramer made, which related to 
the 1981 Loan, constituted past consideration — events that 
occurred before the promise was made. Past consideration is 
legally equivalent to no consideration since "the promisor is 
making his promise because those events occurred, but he is not 
making his promise in order to get them. There is no 'bargaining' 
. . . .
M
 Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 633 (Utah 
App. 1988) (quoting 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 210 (1963)). 
Thus, since all four items presented as consideration to the 
district court were insufficient, that Court correctly ruled that 
the note is void for lack of consideration as a matter of law. 
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C. Kramer did not present any evidence below that the 1987 Note 
constituted the settlement of a "disputed" claim; thus, the 
district court correctly ruled that the 1987 Note was void for 
lack of consideration. 
Kramer argues that the 1987 Note was given in consideration 
for a compromise of the 1981 Loan obligation. In essence, Kramer 
asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the 1987 Note is an 
accord and satisfaction. Kramer's position is somewhat unusual in 
that he bases his affirmative claim on an accord and satisfaction 
which is typically raised as a defense. Kramer therefore bears the 
burden of proving every necessary element of an accord and 
satisfaction. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 
(Utah App. 1988). 
In Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228, 
1229 (Utah 1975), the Supreme Court observed: 
Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt does not 
discharge it; and this is true even though the paying 
debtor exacts a promise that it will do so. The reason 
for this is that in making the part payment, the debtor 
is doing nothing more than he is legally obligated to do, 
and therefore he gives the creditor no consideration for 
the promise that the part payment will be accepted to 
discharge the entire debt. However, there may be varying 
circumstances in which the debtor is induced by the 
request of the creditor to make payment in some manner 
other than he is obligated to do; . . . One of such 
variations is "accord and satisfaction. 
The Supreme Court later restated that proposition: 
As a general rule, a creditor who agrees to accept a 
lesser amount than is due is not bound by his agreement 
because of lack of consideration. 
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Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985). 
Likewise, a creditor may not enforce an accord which is not binding 
on him. 
An accord and satisfaction is a contract and must meet 
contractual requirements. Id. at 732. The consideration 
supporting an accord is the compromise of a bona fide dispute. All 
of the authority cited by Kramer support that proposition. 
Kramer's accord and satisfaction argument fails, however, 
since no dispute was compromised in this case. Prior to signing 
the 1987 Note, Friedman never disputed the existence or amount of 
the obligation arising under the 1981 Loan. Indeed, Kramer asserts 
that "Friedman has always acknowledged and admitted . . . owing the 
original $5,000.00 plus a reasonable amount of interest, or 
possibly an 'exorbitant' amount of interest if Kramer could prove 
it was paid." Appellant's Brief, p. 6, para. 9. It was only 
Kramer's opinion that the $15,000.00 was a compromised amount. 
Appellants' Brief, p. 7, para. 12. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected such an argument when it 
found that no dispute was compromised and, therefore, no 
consideration was given. Jole v. Bredbenner, 95 Or. App. 193, 768 
P.2d 433 (1989). In Jole, the plaintiff sued on the original debt 
due. The defendants raised, as a defense, an "agreement" regarding 
when the debt would be paid. Defendants argued that the agreement 
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was supported by the parties' good-faith settlement of a disputed 
claim. 
Defendants, however, had presented no evidence to the trial 
court that the amount due was in dispute. Instead, the evidence 
indicated that the defendants had simply been unable to make timely 
payments. The court, in holding for the plaintiff, stated "because 
there was no dispute over the amount owing, no compromise could 
have occurred and, thus, as a matter of law, no consideration could 
have been supplied for the August agreement." Id. at 436. 
Likewise, Kramer's "compromise" was not valid consideration because 
Kramer presented no evidence that a dispute ever existed. 
In addition, Kramer cannot now manufacture a dispute by 
arguing that ". . .at the very least substantial doubt existed as 
to whether the debt was barred, . . . " Appellant's Brief, p. 16. 
That argument was similarly advanced and rejected in Jole because 
there was no evidence to suggest that the parties discussed or were 
aware of the statute of limitations defense. Jole, 768 P.2d at 
436. Likewise, no such evidence exists here. 
As a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds to support 
an accord and satisfaction. Tates, Inc., 535 P.2d at 1230. Kramer 
has presented no facts establishing any bona fide dispute by 
Friedman of the 1981 Loan or any meeting of the minds on a 
compromised settlement of a dispute. Kramer's argument must 
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therefore fail. The trial court correctly found that no valid 
consideration was given for the 1987 Note. 
D. Friedman is not estopped from asserting that the 1981 
Loan was barred by the statute of limitations. 
Kramer has argued for the first time on appeal that Friedman 
should be estopped from asserting that the 1981 Loan obligation was 
barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations. Kramer's 
argument is flawed. He failed to plead, brief or argues estoppel 
before the trial court or present any facts in support of his 
argument. Estoppel requires a statement, admission, act or failure 
to act upon which a party reasonably relies to his detriment. CECO 
v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Uteih 1989). 
Kramer argues that the judgment must be reversed because 
material issues of fact exist with respect to his estoppel 
argument. However, Kramer cites no fact which Friedman has 
disputed for purposes of summary judgment. Kramer must show facts 
which, if substantiated, would establish estoppel. Kramer has 
failed to do so. Rather, Kramer merely concludes that his estoppel 
argument presents issues of fact. It is not enough on appeal to 
argue that some set of facts may present issues precluding summary 
judgment. Rather, an appellant must show that the facts presented 
to the trial court establish the claim. If such facts are 
22 
disputed, summary judgment is improper. If the facts presented do 
not establish the claim, it does not matter if they are disputed. 
Kramer argues only that Friedman admitted liability on and 
promised to repay the 1981 Loan on numerous occasions, a fact never 
disputed by Friedman for purposes of summary judgment, and that in 
response Kramer granted extensions of time to repay the debt or a 
period in excess of six years, well past the expiration of the four 
year statute of limitations. Yet, Kramer does not cite any 
evidence to show that Friedman made any statement or admission or 
acted or failed to act in a manner that induced Kramer to forebear 
from commencing an action on the 1981 Loan. Kramer also does not 
allege any facts that suggest Kramer's reliance on Friedman's 
admissions, if any, was either reasonable or detrimental. 
No statements or promises were made to induce Kramer's 
forbearance. No facts were misrepresented by Friedman. To the 
contrary, Friedman's liability was admitted at all times prior to 
the expiration of the statutory period. Friedman made no promise 
to do anything or give anything of value to Kramer if he forbore. 
Friedman did not conceal any fact from Kramer or mislead Kramer in 
any way. Indeed, Friedman was very open and forthright about his 
inability to pay the debt. 
Moreover, Kramer's alleged reliance on repeated promises to 
pay an admitted liability for more than six years was not 
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reasonable. At best, Kramer's "extensions" were based on nothing 
more than the standard admissions of a debtor who he could not pay 
but might be able to pay in the future. See Friedman Deposition, 
R. 114. Kramer's lack of diligence in pursuing his claim against 
Friedman must not be excused simply because Friedman continued to 
admit the liability and confessed his breach. If anything, Kramer 
should have clearly understood that commencement of an action was 
the only recourse available to him. Kramer's "extensions" were 
merely gratuitous delays on his part. By his unilateral 
forbearance, Kramer must not be allowed to rewrite, avoid or be 
excused from the express mandate of the statute of limitations that 
actions be timely commenced. 
The authority relied on by Kramer in support of his estoppel 
argument is distinguishable. Kramer cites the case of Rice v. 
Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) 
for the proposition that the defense of the statute of limitations 
may be barred by estoppel based on acts or conduct of the 
defendant. That case involved tort liability and the admissions 
of an insurance adjustor that compensation would be paid. There 
the plaintiff established that the adjustor had admitted liability 
in negotiations and that based on those admissions, she held let the 
statute of limitations expire to her detriment. 
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The circumstances in Bomba v. W. L. Belvidere, Inc,y 579 F.2d 
1067 (7th Cir. 1978) and Gaoner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d 1168 (R.I. 
1980) were similar. Each of these cases and Rice involved 
settlement negotiations which carried on past the limitations date 
and the cessation of those negotiations after the claims were 
barred. In those cases, estoppel was based on the concession of 
disputed liability during settlement negotiations. Here there were 
no negotiations on or disputes about liability. Friedman did 
nothing and said nothing to lull or mislead Kramer into believing 
that it was unnecessary for Kramer to commence an action. 
Furthermore, in Rice, Gagner and Bomba, the courts found the 
existence of sufficient facts asserted by plaintiff to establish 
estoppel and disputes as to those facts. As discussed above, no 
issues of fact exist in this case. Kramer has simply not alleged 
facts sufficient to establish estoppel. Friedman properly raised 
the statute of limitations below, and the district court properly 
ruled that statute voided the consideration Kramer gave for the 
1987 Note. 
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IV. The district court correctly ruled thatf as a matter of law, 
the 1987 Note did not constitute a written acknowledgement of 
the 1981 Loan. 
Contrary to Kramer's argument in his brief, Friedman has not 
proffered an "unduly restrictive view" of Utah's acknowledgement 
statute, Utah Code Ann, § 78-12-44. See Appellant's p. 20. 
Instead, Friedman's, and the district court's, interpretation of 
that statute follows the reasoning of a long line of Utah cases. 
In 1896, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
So an acknowledgment from which by implication of law a 
promise is to be raised ought to be a direct and 
unqualified admission of a previous, subsisting debt, for 
which the debtor is liable, and which he intends to pay. 
Where the promise of acknowledgment raises at best a mere 
probable inference to pay, being vague and indeterminate, 
and may affect the minds of different persons 
differently, it ought not to be held sufficient evidence 
to create a new cause of action. 
Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah 108, 44 P. 1036, 1038 (1896). 
In 1934, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[t]h€> debtor's 
right not to be harassed upon a stale debt is as absolute as the 
creditor's right to collect on a fresh one." Salt Lake* Transfer 
Co. v. Shurtliff, 83 Utah 488, 30 P.2d 733, 737 (1934). 
Accordingly, the court held that a creditor seeking to revive a 
stale debt bears the burden of proving that the debt was 
acknowledged in writing. Ld. at 736. Further, the court stated 
that "[t]he acknowledgment necessary to start the statute anew must 
be more than a hint, a reference, or a discussion of an old debt; 
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and must amount to a clear recognition of the claim and liability 
as presently existing." Id. at 737. 
Finally, in 1954, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated the 
holdings in Kuhn and Shurtliff and stated that "the statute is 
satisfied by the acknowledgement of a 'claim' and does not require 
that the amount of the claim be acknowledged, or that the claim be 
liquidated." Beck v. Dutchman Coalition Mines Co., 2 Utah 2d 104, 
269 P.2d 867, 870 (1954) (emphasis added). 
Against that background, Kramer contends that the 1987 Note 
is a written acknowledgement of, and therefore revived, the 1981 
Loan. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-22. As a matter of law, 
however, the 1987 Note fails the test set forth in Kuhn, Shurtliff 
and Beck since that note does not evidence an acknowledgment of 
any existing claim, including the 1981 Loan. The 1987 Note does 
not hint at, refer to or discuss the 1981 Loan or any other pre-
existing claim. See Promissory Note, Addendum B hereto. 
Consequently, the district court correctly ruled that the 1987 Note 
did not acknowledge, and therefore did not revive, the 1981 Loan 
as a matter of law. 
Kramer, however, argues that although the 1987 Note does not 
refer to the 1981 Loan or to the existence of any obligation, 
extrinsic evidence may be considered to demonstrate that the 
parties meant the 1987 Note to acknowledge the 1981 Loan. None of 
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the cases cited by Kramer support that contention.6 All three 
cases presuppose that an instrument contains an admission of a pre-
existing obligation; they simply suggest that where such an 
admission exists, extrinsic evidence may used to identify the 
particular debt being admitted or, in the situation alluded to in 
Beck, the amount of the debt being admitted. See Beck, 269 P.2d 
at 820. 
6In Citizens Bank of Clovis v. Teel, 106 N.M. 290, 742 P.2d 
502 (1987), the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed a stipulated 
judgment which stated "that Paul Teel remains personally and 
individually liable to The Citizens Bank of Clovis on the 
obligations secured by the mortgage from him to The Citizens Bank 
of Clovis . . . ." The court held that extrinsic evidence was 
admissible to show that the phrase "obligations secured by the 
mortgage" referred to a note dated September 17, 1979 and thus 
reversed a summary judgment in the debtor's favor. Teel, 742 P.2d 
at 504. 
In Weirton Ice & Coal Co. v. Weirton Shopping Plaza, Inc., 334 
S.E.2d 611 (W.Va. 1985), the West Virginia Supreme Court stated 
that extrinsic evidence can show the amount of the debt being 
acknowledged. However, in that case, the court merely held that 
checks, which were given in partial payment of a debt to a 
particular creditor and identified the account and balance of the 
debt, constituted written acknowledgements of the debt. 
Finally, in House of Falcon v. Gonzalez, 583 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1979), the Texas Court of Appeals held that an 
"apportionment of liability and indemnity clause" contained in an 
agreement between the debtor and a third party was not an 
acknowledgement of the debt sued upon. The clause obligated the 
debtor to be responsible for liabilities incurred before a certain 
date but was insufficient because it did not "specify or 
acknowledge any particular debt." In this case, the 1987 Note does 
not even refer to debts incurred before a certain date; the note 
does not refer to the existence of any debts. See Promissory Note. 
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Since the note in this case did not admit the existence of any 
debt, Kramer cannot escape the plain language of Utah Code Ann, 
§ 78-12-44 and the 1987 Note by introducing parol evidence 
regarding the parties' intentions. The district court properly 
disregarded such evidence and held that the 1987 Note did not 
acknowledge the 1981 Loan as a matter of law. 
The 1987 Note also did not revive the 1981 Loan simply because 
it contained a promise to pay. Only "an acknowledgment of an 
existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same" 
can revive a stale debt. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-44 (emphasis 
added). The term "same" must refer to "an existing liability, debt 
or claim" and thus a writing must contain a promise to pay an 
existing liability before it revives such a liability. The 1987 
Note does not state that Friedman will pay the 1981 Loan or any 
other existing liability, and therefore that Note did not revive 
the loan. 
Finally, Kramer contends that Friedman's partial payment of 
the 1981 Loan revived that obligation under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-44.7 Kramer, however, has never sued on the 1981 Loan. Indeed, 
7Kramer also suggests that Friedman's partial payment extended 
the period for commencing an action on the 1981 Loan under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1). See Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12. 
Friedman submits that section 25(1) does not apply where the 
statute of limitations has already run on the obligation. 
Otherwise, sections 25(1) and 44 would be redundant. Consequently, 
Kramer's partial payment argument under section 25(1) is misplaced. 
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his Second Cause of Action, upon which the district court granted 
summary judgment, alleges only that the 1987 Note acknowledged and 
thereby revived the 1981 Loan. See Amended Complaint, R. 51-53. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that where an acknowledgement 
is made after the statute of limitations has run, "such 
acknowledgement must be pleaded as a basis of the action. " 
Attorney General of Utah v. Pomerov, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277, 
1300 (1937). Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals has held that 
11
 [w] hen a complaint shows on its face that the period for bringing 
an action has run, the plaintiff, to avoid the bar, must plead 
facts sufficient to show that the delay is excused." Eldridge v. 
Eastmoreland General Hospital, 88 Or. App. 547, 746 P.2d 735, 736 
(1987). Kramer has not sued on the 1981 Loan, but rathea: seeks to 
enforce the 1987 Note. Kramer had an opportunity to amend his 
complaint and chose not to sue on the 1981 Loan. He must not now 
be allowed to argue a cause of action not properly before the 
district court. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, "a defendant must be 
extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and to 
meet an adversary's claims." Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 
2d 175, 264 P.2d 279, 280 (1953). In this case, it would be 
Consequently, Friedman will only address Kramer's argument that the 
partial payment revived the 1981 Loan under section 44. 
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manifestly unfair, both to Friedman and to the district court, to 
reverse based on a cause of action that was neither pled nor 
sufficiently argued. Regardless of whether the partial payment 
revived the 1981 Loan, the district court properly granted Friedman 
summary judgment on Kramer's written acknowledgement claim. 
V. The district court correctly ruled that Kramer was not harmed 
by Friedman's alleged fraud as a matter of law. 
Injury is an essential element of a fraud claim. Suaarhouse 
Finance Co., 610 P.2d at 1374; Pace v. Parish, 122 Utah 141, 247 
P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952). Before the district court, Kramer 
contended that Friedman's alleged fraud harmed him by inducing him 
to accept a compromise amount as owing on the 1981 Loan and to 
forego collection efforts on the 1981 Loan. See Amended Complaint, 
R. 53-55. However, as demonstrated above, the 1981 Loan was 
unenforceable when the 1987 Note was executed. Thus, Kramer's 
inability to recover on the 1981 Loan stemm€*d not from Friedman's 
alleged fraud but from Kramer's failure to enforce the loan within 
the limitations period. Since Kramer did not present any evidence 
that Friedman's alleged fraud harmed him, the trial court correctly 
entered summary judgment on Kramer's fraud claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
Kramer had four years in which to sue on the 1981 Loan. His 
failure to do so has had several consequences. First, it deprived 
Kramer of the right to recover on that obligation. Second, it 
rendered meaningless any purported consideration Kramer exchanged 
for the 1987 Note. Finally, it rendered harmless the injuries 
Kramer suffered from Friedman's alleged fraud. Moreover, Kramer's 
arguments regarding the extension of the 1981 Loan due date, 
estoppel, accord and satisfaction, and acknowledgment either were 
not properly pled and argued below or are without merit. The 
district court's ruling was proper in all respects and should be 
affirmed. 
Dated this /^ day of July, 1990. 
ANDERSON & WATKINS 
- > ~ 1? /Pirn Steven W. IJougherty mothy W. Miller 
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MR. ROGNLIE: Peter Rognlie, Burbidge & Mitchell. 
THE COURT: Very well. Who's going to argue? Mr. 
Miller? 
MR. MILLER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
(Whereupon, the Court conversed with other counsel 
in an unrelated matter.) 
THE COURT: Let's return to the matter of Xraner 
versus Friedman. Mr. Miller? 
Let me state, counsel, I've reviewed the respective 
memoranda submitted in this matter, as well as the attach-
ments, and so let's npt replow the same ground. Go ahead, 
Mr. Miller. 
MR. MILLER: May it please the Court, counsel, 
my name is Timothy Miller. Together with Steve Dougherty at 
Anderson & Watkins, we represent Mr. James Friedman. Mr. 
Friedman has moved for summary judgment on all of the ciains 
contained in Mr. Kramer's Amended Complaint. 
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In the Amended Complaint he seeks to recover on a 
promissory note which Mr. Friedman executed in 1987 and I 
will refer to that as the note from now on. He states in 
his second claim that the 1987 note contains an acknowledgment 
of a loan which was allegedly made in 1981. I will refer to 
the loan as the 1981 loan, your Honor. 
The third claim is a claim for fraud in the execution 
of the 1987 note. 
Now, the important facts in this case are as follows. 
On March 12, 1981, Plaintiff wrote a check to Mr. Friedman. 
He alleges that this check was part of a loan of $5,000 he 
was making and he alleges that the loan was due and payable 
within 90 days of March 12th, 1981. Six years later on 
March 21, 1987, Mr. Friedman executed a promissory note in 
favor of Plaintiff for $15,000. On June 10, 1988, Mr. Kramer 
brought suit, first suing simply on the 1987 note. Later he 
amended the Complaint to state the other two claims. 
Mr. Friedman has moved for summary judgment in this 
action because no genuine issue of material fact exists 
as to three facts in this action. The only material facts 
before the Court today. First fact is is that Mr. Kramer 
did not exchange consideration for the 1987 note. This is 
because of a preliminary fact which is that the 1981 loan 
was not evidenced, was not founded upon a written instrument. 
Now, Mr. Kramer contends that the 1981 loan is 
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1
 evidenced by the check and also by the 1987 note. However, 
2 under the rule, under the rule of law by the Utah Supreme 
3
 I Court, the 1981 loan is not founded upon either. To be 
founded upon a written instrument an obligation must arise 
5
 I from that instrument, liability on the obligation must be 
' apparent from the face of the instrument, or the instrument 
7
 I must acknowledge the liability. C!i<-ck does neither of these 
things. Check is simply a check for $5,000. It could be 
* payment for services. It could be anything. It does not 
10
 I state that it is part of a loan. It does not state that 
Mr. Friedman is liable to repay Lhe money to Mr, Kramer. 
Similarly, the 1987 note does not refer to the 1981 
loan in any way so that that obligation which was allegedly 
incurred six years previously could not arise from that 
1987 note. 
Now, since as a matter of law the 1981 loan is not 
founded upon a written instrument, the four-year Statute of 
Limitations contained in 78-12-25 applies. It applies from 
the date that the note became due and payable and was 
unpaid. The Plaintiff has contended that the loan was due 
and payable within 90 days of March 12, 1981, and thus, 
the Statute of Limitations had expired on that loan by the 
time the parties -- excuse me, Mr. Friedman executed the 
24
 | note in 1987 
25 
This is critical because the only consideration which 
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1 Plaintiff contends he gave in exchange for the 1981 loan 
2 is -- or excuse me, for the 1987 note is related to the 1981 
3 loan. He has contended that he made interest payments on 
4
 that loan, that he made the loan itself, that he forbore 
5 collection efforts on that loan, and that he accepted a 
6 compromised payment amount. 
7 None of these four things are effective or constitute 
8 vH.l.jd consideration because at the time the note was 
9 executed Mr. Friedman was not legally obligated to repay the 
10 1981 loan. At best, he was morally obligated to repay that 
11 loan. 
12 The Utah Supreme Court has held that a moral obligatiorj 
13 to repay a debt is not sufficient to constitute considerdtior 
14 in the same way, promises to accept a compromised pay-off 
15 amount or to forbear collection efforts were meaningless 
16 because at the time the promises were allegedly made, 
17 Plaintiff could not collect on that obligation anyway. 
18 The statute had alrendy run. 
19 Finally, the fact that Mr. Kramer allegedly made 
20 interest payments on his own debts can not constitute 
21 consideration because those payments were made in the past. 
22
 He didn't bargain with Mr. Friedman to receive the 1, " note 
23 by making payments on his own debts and thus, no considera™ 
24 tion supports the 1987 note and the first cause of action 
25
 fails as a matter of law. 
1 Similarly, the third cause of action for fraud, even 
2 assuming that Plaintiff could demonstrate the other eight 
3 elements of fraud, the ninth element of injury is clearly 
* lacking in this case. Plaintiff has only contended that he 
5 was harmed by, again, forbearing on the loan, foregoing 
6 further collection efforts, and by accepting a compromise 
7 pay-off amount. Again, at the time the 1987 note was 
8 executed, he could not collect on the 1981 loan anyway 
9 because of the running of the Statute of Limitations. Any 
10 injury in this regard stems from his failure to bring an 
11 action on that loan, not from any alleged fraud. 
12 Finally, the third material fact about which no genuin^ 
13 issue exists is whether the 1987 note constitutes or 
14 contained a written acknowledgement of or promise to pay the 
15 1981 loan. The statute is very specific on this point. 
16 in order to revive a stale debt, you must have an acknow-
17 ledgment of the debt or promise to pay the debt in writing. 
18
 The 1987 note does not refer to the 1981 loan at all. 
19 As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, you must 
20 expressly admit a liability is presently existing before 
21 you have in writing acknowledged that liability. This note 
22
 in this case does not refer Lo the 1981 loan at all. 
23 This isn't a closed case. This isn't like the cases 
24
 J cited by Plaintiff where a document referred to the 
existence of some obligation without identifying the specifi 25 
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obligation to which it refers. 
In this case the note unambiguously friils to mention 
the 1981 loan at all and thus, it can not constitute an 
acknowledgment as a matter of law. 
So in conclusion, Mr. Friedman has moved for summary 
judgment because as a matter of law no consideration 
supports the 1987 note. Plaintiff has not shown and can not 
show any injury from the alleged fraud and as a matter of 
law the 1987 note does not contain a written promise to pay 
or acknowledgment of the 1981 loan. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 
Mr. Rognlie? 
MR. ROGNLIE: Thank you, your Honor. It's important 
to view this case not just by viewing the f81 loan arrange-
ment that they entered into and the f87 note even -is just 
related transactions and they certainly were. Friedman 
even admits that in his deposition and I don't think that 
is an excluded fact that they were related. Friedman says, 
19
 "Yes, the '87 note that I wrote out, -jcive to Kramer, was at 
20
 least partially related to the '81 loan and there was a lot 
21
 of discussions about that at the time the note w.iS 
22
 exchanged." 
23
 The ca5-,<i really has to be looked at in regard to the 
24
 overall context of what occurred. The events started, 
25
 obviously, in »81. At that time Kramer and Friedman were 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 | very close, personal friends and Friedman in March of '81 
2 | called Kramer to arrange for a loan. He called him up 
3| and said, "Listen, I'm in big trouble," and I'm paraphrasing, 
4 I I'm not quoting from the deposition. "I'm in big trouble. 
5 | I need money. I need $5,000 and I can't turn anywhere 
6 I else to get it." He admitted later in his deposition that 
7 I he could not borrow that money from a commercial source. 
8 | He talked to Kramer and Kramer said, "Well, I don't 
have it but I can get it for you somewhere, but it's 
probably going to cost you a lot of money." 
Friedman said, "Well, look into it." 
So after that occurs, the same day, next day, what-
ever it was, Friedman is told by Kramer, Kramer says, "I 
have a Shylock," I guess referring to the Merchant of 
Venice, "on the street. Fie can loan you the $5,000. He 
can get iL for you, but it's going to cost you a hundred 
17 | dollars a week." 
18
 I Friedman says, "Go ahead, I'll pay the hundred dollars 
19 I a week, but get the money." So Kramer arranges for the 
20 I I0...1, forwards a personal check, and forwards the cash 
21 (money he receives from the man on the street to Friedman. 
'\fter that they originally had agreed to have that amount 
23 | repaid in 60 to 90 days. Friedman attempted to repay that 
24 I by writing a check just for the principal amount a couple of 
25
 I months later. I believe it was in May, and that check 
8 
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bounces . 
After that, we hit a series of conversations where 
Kramer is repeatedly, usually by telephone but also sending 
monthly statements, but also by telephone talking with 
Friedman and saying, "Hey, I need the money." Friedman's 
basically responding « I'm paraphrasing. I can't quote 
every instance and probably can't recall every instance. 
Says, "I know I owe the money. I'll pay you back, but I 
need a little time." 
And then we get then to a long series of extensions 
of time requested by Friedman, granted by Kramer over the 
course of six years. We have Friedman basically imposing 
on his friend even further. He's for the first year paying 
a hundred dollars a week to the Shylock for interest on this 
money and then after that is paying for the most part of 
the time the prime rate plus two percent to cover money 
that he had incurred under this loan arrangement with 
Friedman. 
It's important to remember that while we have those 
repeated extensions of time, there's really only one basic 
debt outstanding between the parties. This isn't a case 
where we're confusing services that are -- money payable for 
services rendered or any other debt. There's only one 
debt from March of '81 through March of '87 and beyond 
between these _'/o parties, and there's never any dispute 
when they have conversations as to 
where that obligation stemmed from. 
In March of '87 after Kramer 
extensions of time to pay, the parti 
true, Friedman suggested, I guess, 
the matter with a promissory note. 
would finally put things in writing 
who ower?> who money and 
had granted several 
es decided and it is 
that they resolve 
The promissory note 
It also would grant 
Friedman in March of f87 until December of '07 to make the 
final payment and Friedman prepared 
I plus interest as recited in the not 
opinion, was a compromised amount. 
if you figure the fact that for the 
only owed $5,000 but was incurring 
dollars per week, he had well over 
after the first year, so after the 
that note for $15,000 
e which, in Mr. Kramer's 
That seems high, but 
first year that he not 
interest at a hundred 
$10,000 in debt just 
remaining five he's 
1 paying prime plus two and it's clearly over $15,000. 
Nevertheless, he settled for a comp romised note and in that 
time he agrees he will not sue or n.ike any other collection 
efforts on that debt until such time as the note becomes 
due and payable in December. 
There are several issues of f 
case which preclude the granting of 
The primary one is the question of 
act presented in this 
summary judgment. 
when the '81 debt actually 
became due and payable. Granted, originally it was due and 
payable as they agreed in 60 to 90 days or call it 90 days. 
10] 
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Friedman made an attempt to repay the loan within that 
time with a check that bounced. After that was the first 
time that he asked Kramer for additional time to pay. 
The grant of an extension of time when the parties 
get together, say, "I need another six months," and the 
party who's owed the obligation grants that extension of 
time, obviously the Statute of Limitations then gets 
extended along with it, so if you and I have a debt that's 
due in one year and after about ten months one comes to the 
other and says, "We'll work some more time into the arrange-
ment, we'll go another six months," the statute then does 
not run until after that additional six months begins to 
run. 
Kramer's testimony from his affidavit primarily and 
also from his deposition is that at least once a year, 
ahd that's probably a bare minimum, Kramer had conversations 
with Friedman sometimes as often as every month or two 
months, but during those conversations Friedman very con-
sistently, if not routinely, did a couple of things. Me 
20 I knitted to owing the money plus interest. Number two, he 
21 promised he'd pay the money and if they hadn't discussed it 
22
 I recently, he usually concluded the conversation with 
23 I something to '.he effect of, "I need more time and I'll pay 
2* you when I can, but I need more time," and at that request, 
25
 I Kramer would grant him more time, so in effect we have all 
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the way up until f87 when that note is delivered, Friedman 
asking for more time, Kramer granting it, and realistically 
looking at it, the note itself was an agreement to grant 
additional time from March of '87 until December of '87. 
Therefore, the statute we think doesn't run. 
Therefs a renl question of fact as to whether that '81 
debt became actually due and payable in 90 days and then 
the statute began to run, or whether there were verbal 
extensions of time which continued to put off the date when 
the statute would begin to run. 
The second major issue of fact revolves around the 
question of consideration. I'll discuss that a little more 
later and the third is the question of whether the '81 loan 
is in any way related to the '87 note. 
Friedman in his pleadings, or at least in his motion 
for summary judgment, maintains that it was not. However, 
in his deposition he clearly agrees that it was at least 
partially related and as the events occurred here, there w^s 
really no question th-at when that '87 note was exchanged, 
Friedman admitted that he owed the '81 amount. He later 
even in his deposition after the action was filed admitted 
to owing that amount and there's really no question they're 
related if the Court reviews the statements from the 
deporii'-ion. 
If th<i'je is a question, it's a question for the trier 
l_2j 
4 
1 of fact to decide and it isnft a question that can be 
2 decided on summary judgment. 
3 J The question of the consideration really has severdl 
aspncts to it. Kramer alleges more in terms of considera-
5 I tion than just the '87 loan and the interest payments made 
6 there on, although clearly under Kuhn v. Mount that original 
7 debt is sufficient to consideration to support the new 
8 obligatione 
9 In their reply brief Friedman cites Manwill v. 
10 Oyler to attempt to dictate a different result. I think 
11 that case can be distinguished for several reasons. The 
12 first is that the Plaintiff in Manwill v. Oyler conceded 
13 the Statute of Limitations and the only consideration he 
H was asserting was the, quote, unquote, moral obligation 
15 of the Defendant. The Defendant attempts to use that case 
16 J to say that a stale debt can not be revived. I don't think 
•ihfit's what the case says. The case merely addresses the 
question of the moral obligation issue and in fact, that 
19 I opinion specifically recognizes the statute which permits 
20 under the words of the case, an outlawed obligation to be 
21 J renewed by written promise to pay, and the case does not 
overrule Kuhn v. Mount that Kramer relies on to suggest --
23 I Ltfs clearly stated, I should say, that the original 
24 J obligation supports the note. 
The other consideration given by Kramer includes -- and 
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I address this in the memorandum and I won't go into it at 
length, but includes the acceptance of a conpromised amount 
which is clearly sufficient consideration, and in addition 
to that, the forbearance on Kramer's part, his agreement 
not to sue or make any further collection efforts in 
exchange for that note, at least until the note became due. 
Obviously, if it became due and Kramer didn't pay, '.he 
understanding was that he would continue to either pursue 
some collection efforts short of lawsuit or a lawsuit. 
The Defendant also, I think, ignores pertinent 
language of the Utah Code Section 78-12-25 sub 1 which 
states that certain actions may be brought within four 
years, quote, provided that action on all the foregoing 
cases nay be commenced at any time within four years after 
the last charge is made or the last payment is received. 
Now, Friedman made a partial payment that, according to 
his deposition testimony, he said was on the '31 loan. Now, 
granted it happened to occur after the promissory note was 
exchanged. The partial payment was either in December of 
'87 or August of f88, but even that partial payment will 
?vsrve to revive the f81 obligation. Even if the Statute of 
Limitations had run as the Defendant maintains, the f81 loan 
is also revived by operation of 78-12-44. That statute 
says in any case founded on a contract, when any part of 
the principal or interest shall have been paid or an 
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acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim or 
any promise to pay the same shall have been made, an action 
may be brought within the period prescribed for the same 
and for such payment, acknowledgment or promise- And then 
it goes on to say the debt must be in writing. 
The clear intent of the parties when Friedman came up 
with the idea of the note was to accomplish repayment of the 
'81 debt by way of a compromised pay-off in the allowance 
of additional time. There really is no other plausible 
interpretation of the facts in this case. That had to be the 
only thing on their mind. 
Now, the defense says that you can't consider extrinsic 
evidence. I believe that's incorrect. The extrinsic 
evidence is clearly admissible here. They cite the cases 
that discuss whether a document is facially deficient or 
ambiguous or uncertain. If this document is indeed 
ambiguous or is not ambiguous or uncertain, then clearly it 
states Friedman owes Kramer $15,000. 
19
 I If the Court needs to look further to discover more 
20 J of the terms of that agreement, then it is ambiguous and 
21 | extrinsic: evidence is admissible. That's clear under Utah 
law. The extrinsic evidence is overwhelming, really. 
Friedman again -- and I don't mean to keep repeating 
24 myself, but even at the time the note was exchanged, he'd 
25
 I been doing this for six years, but even at the time the note 
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was exchanged, the '81 debt admitted he owed that principal 
amount plus interest, promised that he would pay Kramer that 
money, and that the note was the means by which he would 
accomplish that, that promise, and make that promise good. 
There's no question that the two were related and that 
the intent of delivering that note was to repay that debt 
originally incurred in 1981. There was no other debt. 
There was no money, other money, owed between the parties, 
and the only other explanation Friedman can come up with as 
to why that note exists is his statement that he gave the 
note to Friedman so Friedman could use it in his divorce 
action. 
THE COURT: You mean to Kramer? 
MR. ROGNLIE: To Kramer, yes, so Kramer could use it 
in his divorce action, the theory being that if Kramer could 
show more debt, more money -- excuse me -- mo.n* receivables 
than he actually had coming in to him, he would somehow 
benefit in the divorce action. 
That doesn't hold up. Clearly, if he was showing an 
additional 15,000 in receivables, that would mean that his 
wife would be looking for an additional $7,500 that Kramer 
didn't have anc?s under Friedman's theory, would never 
expect to get. That's the only other explanation for the 
note that we have ever heard and clearly, that's not plausibl 
The only plausible explanation is it was made to repay the 
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'81 debt. 
As to the fraud allegation, I won't go to any length 
to repeat what we've stated in our memorandum, although 
clearly, if you have money that's owing to you and the 
person refuse'; to pay it, you are injured. In addition 
to that, according to Friedman, he signed the note basically 
to defraud either Kramer or Kramer's wife in terms of this 
divorce action explanation that he did. That explanation 
is certainly implausible and Friedman admits in his 
depo HCJJH.I.:? that the '81 debt and the note are at least 
partially related, so there's a conflict in Friedman's own 
testimony in his depo. 
Really, what Friedman did by saying, "No, I gave 
Dan-iy Kramer that note because he needed it for his 
divorce," was attempt to blackmail Kramer into not collect-
ing a debt that was clearly owed. 
Friedman, to recap it briefly, calls Kramer up in '81, 
He needs the money bad and he gets the money and he agrees to 
terms that you and I might not seem to think would be 
reasonable, but they are the only terms available. After 
that, he begins to impose on his friend even further to 
make interest payments for him and go to additional 
measures and keeps putting out and eventually comes up with 
the theory that this note is invalid, A, either because I 
only gave it to him for his divorce which was -- but I'm 
17 
using the term blackmail softly as an attempt to scare him 
off from trying to collect, and then walks to court claiming 
there was no consideration, et cetera, in an attempt to 
avoid paying. 
It's a case that, quickly summarized, involves two 
people who used to be very good friends, one of whom loans 
a substantial amount of money and paid a substantial amount 
of interest for the other, and the other who's trying to bene 
from that under the eyes of the law, t^ Ut- that money 
and run with it, and that result, I think, would be 
intolerable. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Rognlie, thank you. 
Mr. Miller? 
MR. MILLER: Thank you, your Honor. 
All of the facts presented by counsel are very 
interesting. However, none of them are material. Even 
assuming they are true, they do not affect this motion. 
I want to take the partial payment first,. The part of 
78-12-25 which he cites refers to open accounts and is 
not relevant to this case. However, it is true that 
78-12-44 includes a provision which says that partial 
payment can revive a stale debt. Unfortunately, Plaintiff 
did not plead partial payment and under Utah law, where an 
obligation is stale, where its enforceability is barred by 
the Statute of Limitations, the act or the writing which 
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revives that must be pled. 
Secondly, even assuming the alleged partial payment 
was made, it does not affect the conclusion regarding 
consideration and fraud. The claim is that partial payment 
was made significantly -- I mean, either December '87 or 
August of !88, sometime in that span, but significantly, 
after the 1987 note was executed, so at the time it was 
executed, even assuming the partial payment somehow revived 
the 1981 loan, at the time that the note w.-ts executed, it 
was not enforceable and therefore, it could not serve as 
consideration. 
He talks about Kuhn v. Mount. Kuhn v. Mount is an 
acknowledgment case and it does cite that the past debt is 
sufficient consideration for an acknowledgment. We don't 
contest that, your Honor. We don't -- if the parties who 
supposedly so clearly intended this to be an acknowledgment 
had created an acknowledgment within the statute, had at 
least referred to some existing obligation, we wouldn't be 
here today, and it's true that the past obligation would 
serve as consideration for that, but, your Honor, they 
21 didn't. They didn't refer to the past obligation in th 
e 
1
 1987 note and you can not go beyond the words of the statute 
23 J to find an acknowledgment where none is. 
24
 ' The statute requires an acknowledgment in writing, 
25
 «We do not have one here. We have a writing. We have a 1987 
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note which doesn't refer to the previous obligation at all, 
doesn't refer to the existence of an obligation, and it is 
true that the note contains an unambiguous promise to pay 
$15,000. That is correct. However, that promise is not 
supported by consideration as is shown in our moving 
papers and also today, so whether or not or even assuming 
those two documents are related, even assuming everything 
he said, the fact that they're related does not preclude 
sunmary judgment because the statute doesn't say if two 
obligations are related, then one revives the other. The 
statute requires an acknowledgment in writing. If you 
look at the note, there's no question that it, as a 
matter of law, is not an acknowledgment in writing. 
Finally, he talks about when the 1981 loan was due 
and payable. All I can rely upon is upon the Amended 
Complaint which states that it was due and payable within 
90 days. Plaintiff has not suggested any grounds upon 
which that Statute of Limitations would be pulled in this 
case and thus, it expired before the note was executed 
and could not serv'e as consideration for that note. 
Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT; All right. Thank you, Mr. Miller. 
Counsel, this is a particularly curious case because 
it is fraught with the very issues that you're arguing here 
today in rather classic form. 
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I am of the view that as inequitable, Mr. Rognlie, 
as it may be, that the limitations period in this case 
did commence on the date that the Amended Complaint states 
it did and based upon the testimony in the deposition of 
Mr. Kramer. 
I am, moreover, convinced that there has been no 
acknowledgment to comply with the law of this state and 
that the consideration, alleged consideration, must fail 
because there was no obligation owing at the time of the 
note in March of '87. I say this because I am of the view 
that if you choose to appeal this matter, and I would 
certainly urge you to do so, it seems to me that it would 
be more appropriate to have this issue resolved up front 
before trial than after trial. 
I recognize, and I think all parties agree, that Mr. 
Kramer in good faith provided the money to Mr. Friedman, 
his friend, and did make the interest payments on the money, 
and I agree that Mr. Friedman's position at this stage, 
that the money is not owed based upon these technicalities, 
may not effect the morality of what's being done here, 
but nevertheless, I think legally Mr. Friedman's position 
is well taken. I must grant the summary judgment. 
Mr. Miller, you prepare the appropriate Order, and I 
would urge you gentlemen to expedite this matter if you're 
able on appeal because if for some reason I am reversed, 
21 
1 then we'll get the matter back on the trial calendar. But 
2 I'm afraid, given the status of the case at this point, I 
3 have no alternative but to grant the summary judgment. 
4 MR. MILLER: Your Honor, should the Order include a 
5 certification for appeal? 
6 THE COURT: I am of the view that it should and if 
7 that's not objected to by you, Mr. Rognlie, I'll grant that 
8 request. 
g MR. ROGNLIE: I guess I don't object. I have a 
10 couple of preliminary questions. 
H One would be the issue of whether Kramer granted 
12 extensions of time to pay and whether that then allowed 
13 the statute --
14 THE COURT: Oh, no, I'm not asking for an opportunity 
15 for you to reargue your case. I'm merely asking if you 
16 have any objection to the request to certify this as a 
17 final Order. 
18 MR. ROGNLIE: No. 
19 THE COURT: I'm of the view that's appropriate, 
20 counsel. This does extinguish the case if indeed I'm 
21 correct, and I may well be wrong, so I would agree that we 
22 ought to cejtify it as a final Order so the matter can get 
23 on the road if there's going to be an appeal. 
24 Very well, counsel, thank you. 
25 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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PROMISSORY NOTE 
$15,000.00 March 21, 1987 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JAMES FRIEDMAN, hereby prom i..si.i.c; to p-»y »:o the order of 
DANNY KRAMER the sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000) in lawful 
currency of the United States on December 31, 1987. The 
principal amount v/ill bear and accrue interest at the base 
rate (prime rate) quoted by First Interstate Bank, Salt Lake 
City, Utah on the date hereof. The principal and interest 
may be paid prior to maturity hereof without prepayment 
penalty. 
The Maker hereby v/aives presentment and demand for 
payment, notice of nonpayment, protest and notice of protest. 
Maker further agrees to pay all cost of collection, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees, if this* note is not paid at 
maturity. 
( 
.-fames Fi\u"cli'.:.'i". 
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